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This is a report of my PhD dissertation titled “Traditional Moral Values of the Oromo of 
Ethiopia: A Philosophical Appraisal of Gada System”. The dissertation ventures to 
accomplish three missions – one is the mission of bringing the traditional moral values of 
the Oromo people to light, the other is to critically evaluate the content of these values and 
the third is to demonstrate the applicability of philosophical inquiry to the concrete life and 
relations of human beings.  
The entire text of the dissertation is composed of six chapters. At the end of each 
chapter there are critical analyses, conclusions, references and notes. Finally at the end of 
the whole body of the dissertation there is bibliography and appendix. The appendix 
contains the pictures of some of the elderly informants who orally shared their knowledge 
of the traditional moral values of the Oromo society.  The first chapter attempts to lay out 
the problems that instigated the research, the general problems that the dissertation 
addresses, the methods that the researcher employs, and a conceptual and theoretical 
groundwork for the subsequent chapters.  
 
Background  
Human persons should not be looked upon as beings explainable only in terms of facts, but 
also as beings of value- orientations and systems. In knowledge, among the many 
important things, people are concerned with facts and values. Barry (1983: 93) observed 
that philosophers distinguish between a factual and value judgments. A factual judgment 
describes an empirical relationship or reality whereas value judgment assesses the worth of 
objects, acts, feelings, attitudes and even people. We make choices, decisions or 
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preferences depending on the values of the thing under consideration. “The value system 
we acquire and develop affects our attitudes, preferences, goals and aspirations.” (Tripathi 
2003: 22) “In short, the living space we create for our selves, and the quality of our lives, 
are determined by our system of life.” (Ibid: 23) Values express the worth, importance or 
the utility of things, actions, behaviors, relations, systems, etc. 
It is thought very often that value is not what is concretely lived but an abstract 
concept that should be contemplated. But this is not true.  We value or evaluate daily the 
value of many things. On the basis of the value we ascribe to each, we develop certain 
attitudes towards them. We value things, because we value ourselves too. Without values 
the survival and flourishing of humanity is just precarious. Moral value is fundamental to 
all forms of value. According to Pojman, moral value is a set of “rules that are necessary 
for human survival and flourishing.” (2005:78) It is with reference to this value that human 
actions and behaviors are evaluated as right or wrong, good or evil. But human kind have 
not studied and developed values as much as it has been doing with facts. Particularly 
traditional moral values have not caught the attention of scholars as much as they should.  
Undertaking research on values is a daunting task to venture into. Yet it is the essential 
trait of human reality that ought to be explored. Moral value that pervades almost all 
human actions and behaviors is even more daunting for research than other forms of value. 
This is due to its complexity that emanates from the intricate nature of human beings, their 
relationships and mental states. Although I was aware of the intricacies of the subject, I 
convinced myself to undertake research in the indigenous moral values of the Oromo 
society, for my PhD dissertation.  I would like to mention only four reasons that inspired 
me to study the traditional moral value of the Oromo society. First, it is largely the 
unexplored (or unexamined) aspect of the people’s life. Two, it is primarily a pervasive 
element in the lives of all societies. Third, research provokes the interest of searching into 
what is there in the storehouse of the traditional values. Forth, there is a necessity of 
bringing the treasure of philosophy to the objective reality of human society. 
One of the severe follies of humankind arises mainly from its failure to critically 
examine itself. Although the necessity of self-knowledge has ever seized the mind of 
people, it has not yet acquired the place it deserved. With hazy eyes, blurred vision and 
unclear mind to oneself the possibility of creating a better society is certainly uncertain. 
Many of the atrocities that humanity unfortunately experienced might be the results of lack 
of self-knowledge. The confinement of human cognition to the knowledge of external 
things alone cannot meaningfully address human problems. Knowing what and who we are 
internally is equally important since it is the knowledge of how brilliant or foolish, strong 
or weak, good or bad, right or wrong we were and we are. 
 
 Analysis of the Problems 
Many of the elements that constitute the personalities of the Oromo people are implanted in 
their traditions. Traditional moral values, in particular, have tremendous role in shaping 
their lives and personality. Viewed from this angle, tradition has an enormous contribution 
to what and who they were in the past, what and who they are at the present. Not only 
external factors shape human reality, but also those which are put in them in the form of 
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thoughts, spiritual doctrines, philosophical ideas, customary norms, moral judgments and 
beliefs. Traditional moral values are embedded in all of these.   
The internal reality of humankind is intricately knitted together through infinite 
threads of values and facts. People focus, however, more on things that are external to them 
than on those that constitute their internal life. Facts of the external things are more known 
than moral values that have tremendous role in shaping, developing and guiding human 
personality. Leaving traditional moral values unexplored is tantamount to blinding oneself 
to one’s own reality. I am of the opinion that the key to all the challenges that unceasingly 
haunt Ethiopia and its people lie, by and large, in the traditional moral values of its people. 
From the present experience it can be said that either people have not made this tradition to 
flourish into modern form or conversely, tradition has not made people to flourish.  
Every tradition has its strong and weak sides. It is impossible to think that they are 
entirely useless since they may contain dynamic elements that can serve the good purposes 
of human beings, and in the same logic it is unreasonable to consider them as entirely 
useful because they may embrace apathetic components. Some traditions may hurt more 
than they do help; others may help more than they hurt. The point is to understand the 
extent to which they help or hurt. Thus, it sounds to argue that no indigenous value should 
be considered useless before it is critically evaluated.  The uncritical approach people have 
towards traditions is harmful in at least three ways. First, we cannot be aware of the 
constraints that traditional values impose on us. We take them for granted when in fact they 
contain a lot of unreasonable, irrational, superstitious, unchecked beliefs and ideas. Second, 
we might not be enlightened about the good and bad dimensions the traditional moral 
values entail. In the light of the modern culture of the West, we may think that our 
traditional values are entirely archaic and burden that should be avoided. Contrarily, they 
may embrace universally valid ingredients. Third, we cannot develop self knowledge that 
instills sense of confidence in ourselves. Lack of sound knowledge of what constitute our 
reality often generates identity crisis. That is why the thesis begins with the hypothesis that 
traditional moral values should not be entirely accepted or rejected. Rather, they must 
critically be analyzed and synthesized.    
In the context of western philosophy, tradition and modernity are very often 
antagonized. The word ‘tradition’ very often connotes negative meaning whereas the term 
modernity is loaded with a positive one. Modernity is seen as good, safe, humane and 
rational whereas tradition is seen as devoid of these good qualities. But this may not be 
true. Modernity should not make us think that everything in the storehouse of our tradition 
is backward and harmful, and everything in the culture of the West is good. Tradition also 
should not blind us to the good sides of modernity. This is one of the basic reasons why my 
dissertation sets out from the belief that tradition is not virtually useless and modernity is 
not totally good.  
We need to reflect on traditional values for three major reasons. One, it is important to 
know how rational and relevant they are in addressing human questions and solve 
problems; two, it is important to clearly grasp and disclose to what extent they hinder 
human progress and third, to figure out the place they hold in the entire value system of the 
world. Traditional values largely express a common level consciousness. They may, on one 
hand, contain superstitious and false beliefs, and rational and valid forms of thought on the 
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other. Viewed from this angle, undoubtedly there is a necessity of investigating traditional 
moral values. But which subject is reasonably appropriate to undertake this investigation?   
 
Philosophical Inquiry in Tradition  
 
If there is a domain of investigation to which the traditional moral values of societies fall as 
objects of enquiry, it is primarily philosophy. The predominance of undefined and 
unrefined concepts, unexamined and unfounded beliefs in traditional value systems, is very 
obvious. Traditional state of life is a life-situation where complex challenges remain 
critically unchecked. We cannot use hard sciences for checking these parts of human 
reality. We cannot also afford to leave them unexplored. Conceptual analysis is inevitable 
for such investigation. In this scenario the service of philosophy is tremendously important.  
How philosophy could be applied to life and social relations has been one important 
point of contention. People think very often that philosophy deals only with abstract things. 
It appears as if it is inapplicable to the concrete life and world of man. Indeed man has 
philosophized much more about things that are non-humans. We have, therefore, applied 
either little or no philosophy to some aspects of human reality. This is not because 
philosophy has failed to provide us with knowledge, but rather humankind has not used 
philosophy as much as it is required.  
Just as the known is in the realm of sciences, the unknown is always in the territory of 
philosophy. Philosophy is basically rooted in human reality, the reality which is composed 
of things that are accessible and inaccessible to sciences of hard facts. We assume that we 
have knowledge of things that are accessible to sciences. But what could be said about 
those aspects of human reality that are inaccessible to physical sciences? Should we leave it 
as a part of human reality to which we remain ignorant? The explorations of those aspects 
of life that are inaccessible to these sciences are left to philosophy.  
Philosophy has the capacity of extending the cognitive power of humans to aspects of 
life and reality that other disciplines cannot reach, and also the ability to integrate or 
synthesize the fragmented knowledge of different fields. However, it must be underlined 
that those issues that are inaccessible to hard sciences and unknown are not necessarily and 
always elsewhere but also here in human reality. Traditional moral values, for example, are 
one of those that are, in philosophical terms, less known aspects of humans.  This is what 
makes the critique of philosophy towards traditional moral values, very imperative. 
A great deal of philosophical concepts is analyzed over and over again. Indeed this is 
not bad. But it is not as urgent as the philosophical studies of those things that have never 
been un-reflected upon. The traditions of many societies of the present world are largely 
un-reflected upon. It means the life of the bulk of human population of the present day 
world is unexamined.  
Philosophy is the criticism of the common level consciousness. Traditional forms of 
thought are appropriate subjects for philosophy to study. I am of the opinion that one of the 
grave problems why the human world fails to adequately solve its problems is because it 
does not properly and sincerely use philosophy to understand and explain itself as much as 
required.  
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This study aims to contribute to both the life of man and the development of 
philosophy. Its approach bridges the gap between the reality of man and the knowledge of 
philosophy. Its effort is to show the applicability and meaningfulness of philosophy to the 
concrete life of humans. The more humanity brings philosophy to light, the better it makes 
it a lively and meaningful area of knowledge; and the more philosophy becomes living, the 
deeper the knowledge humanity acquires about itself.   
 
Methodology and contents of the dissertation  
One important question is how the traditional values of a specific society can be studied 
philosophically? In terms of the method it employs, the thesis may slightly deviate from the 
conventional way of making philosophical investigation. In both conventional and non-
conventional reflections, analysis is the core method. In the conventional one it is 
philosophical concepts that are often analyzed. What makes the approach of this thesis 
different from that of the conventional one is that the objects of its reflection are the 
traditional moral values.  
The dissertation is based on the data obtained from sociological, anthropological, 
historical, and linguistic studies and also from the field research. It shifts from the 
conventional analysis of philosophical concepts to the analysis of data reflecting the 
empirical realities of people. The basic motif is to use the rich analytical method of 
philosophy to develop genuine knowledge of the human self and reality. In other words, the 
major objective of this thesis is not to report the traditional moral value of the Oromo 
people as it is in itself but to reflect on the strength or rationality of its foundation. To that 
effect, the data collected are philosophically analyzed and synthesized in order to sift the 
truth from falsity, the rational from the non-rational of this value.  
The thesis makes philosophical analysis in the form of critical assessment at three 
levels – first, right in the context of a particular subject or topic, second at the end of a 
chapter and third in the last chapter of the thesis. The critical assessment focuses primarily 
on the points or reasons that are philosophically unpalatable, irrelevant, logically or 
rationally inconsistent. Although undertaking a research of this nature is tedious, the 
researcher believes that at the end of the day it is a rewarding intellectual endeavor, since 
the humanity of humankind lies more in the reality of the commonplace than it does in the 
transcendence.   
Chapter two is all about the subject of the study. It is titled “The Oromo of Ethiopia”. 
The physical, geographical, demographic and ethnographic (linguistic, religious, history, 
moral, the myth of common origin and socio-political systems) features of Ethiopia as a 
country and of the Oromo as a people are briefly given in sections 1, 2, and 3 of the 
chapter. The dissertation looked into these features because they are value-loaded features.                   
Chapter three is titled “Gada System: A Storehouse of Values”. The chapter is 
concerned with the genesis, evolution and the nature of Gada System. Gada is the 
comprehensive system that the Oromo people had been developing and using at least for 
five centuries before the end of the 19th century. As a comprehensive system of thought it 
integrates political, social, religious and moral values. This is what makes it a storehouse of 
values. The chapter is divided into three major parts. The first part briefly presents some 
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basic features of the system, the second part attempts to show the philosophical nature of 
the system and the third describes how Gada consistently organizes the society in to 
various social and political platforms for the purpose of enabling every person play an 
important role in leading  a harmonious and peaceful life.  
There is a point of philosophical interest in the second part of this chapter. It is 
devoted to the exploration of whether the Gada system is a religion, politics, philosophy or 
any nebulous and uncritical form of thought. To figure out whether it is a philosophy or 
not, it requires addressing one philosophical debate being undertaken currently on the 
existence and features of African philosophy. There are two diametrically opposite 
philosophical trends in response to the question whether such a thing as “African 
philosophy” exists or not. One trend posits and the other trend negates (or at least doubts) 
the existence of African philosophy. To examine whether Gada is a philosophy or not, the 
thesis first attempts to unravel the theoretical issues debated between these two trends.  
After having examined the arguments advanced for and against, the dissertation finally 
came up with the conclusion that the essential feature that makes philosophy what it is, is 
its critical and rational nature. Thus, although it is logically fallacious to argue that all the 
African traditions have philosophical stuff, it is impossible to deny that there are some 
traditions that are philosophical at their own basis. The Oromo Gada is one of the African 
traditions that is primarily a philosophy.  
Although it is a complex system of thought in which there are rational, non-rational 
and irrational forms of ideas, its criticality, rationality, comprehensiveness, coherence, 
logical consistence and harmony in addressing the important questions of life and relations 
makes it plausibly a philosophy. Predominantly it is a moral, social and political 
philosophy since it is concerned more with the issues of values of life than knowledge of 
facts. The construction of peaceful and harmonious life or in general the creation of good 
life is the ultimate aim that it wants to achieve. 
The third part of the chapter attempts to explain the political philosophy of the Gada 
system. In its political dimension, the Oromo Gada System addresses the problem of 
leadership. It describes how the society should organize itself across the age-sets for the 
purpose of training people, electing leaders, governing the society, monitoring officials and 
counseling people.  Upon analysis, the dissertation has arrived at the conclusion that the 
Gada of the Oromo is a desirable system of rule. It was the system in which the Oromo 
people not only taught and learnt how to harmoniously live together, but also how leaders 
should peacefully come to power and leave this power, how rulers ought to rule and 
subjects to be ruled.                                      
Chapter four is devoted to the traditional moral values of the Oromo society, known as 
safuu. The title of the chapter is “Moral Values of Oromo”. Safuu (the moral value of 
Oromo) is the underpinning principle of Gada. It is thought that if the rules of safuu are not 
observed all sorts of human pursuits would be chaotic, precarious and injurious. The thesis 
attempts to disclose that safuu defines what virtues to pursue, what vices to avoid, what 
rights to enjoy and what responsibilities to discharge. In this sense, safuu is a moral 
category that prescribes what human actions and behaviors ought to be. The chapter is 
divided into twelve sections, and several sub-subsections. It discusses the meaning of safuu 
in its various shades in order to disentangle its moral meaning. Its various aspects are 
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expressed through different topics. The chapter attempts to bring out to light the very 
foundation of safuu.  The actions, characters or behaviors that safuu appreciates are shown. 
The fact that the core concepts of safuu are rooted in the human values such as human life, 
dignity, right, freedom, interest, etc. are discussed. What an individual human being is to 
the society and human society to the individual is described. The concepts of good, 
truthfulness, honesty and peace are raised and discussed as the core virtues of safuu. 
Concepts of friendship, Oromo work ethic and social pathologies are also figured out.       
Safuu shares certain features in common with the virtue ethics of the ancient Greeks. 
In virtue ethics moral rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness is rooted in the 
character of the moral agent.  Similarly, in the Oromo safuu character of a person occupies 
the central place. In this sense, in both the virtue ethics of the Greeks and the safuu of the 
Oromo the internal character of the moral agent is decisively emphasized. For both the 
ultimate purpose is to produce excellent persons who could act or behave out of goodness.  
There is link between the character of a person and the acts and behaviors of that person. A 
person of good character does not act in a morally wrong way unless and otherwise by 
accident. With the same logic, a person of bad character does not act in a morally right way 
unless forced by accident or external conditions. Both moral good and moral evil are 
motivated by the character of the moral agent. Safuu prescribes what we ought to do and 
not to do, what we ought to be and not to be in order to promote good life. It teaches that 
persons destroy the path to the attainment of good life, by doing what they ought not to do, 
or by being what they ought not to be. Evils do not only block the road to good life but also 
threaten the survival of life.                        
This chapter also extensively and intensively expounds the Oromo traditional concept 
of peace. There are three major reasons for acclaiming this concept in particular. One, 
indeed peace is generally a moral concept. It holds key place in the Oromo traditional 
values (safuu). Second, apparently of all the important subjects, philosophy seems to have 
given less attention to peace, when it should have made it deserve more attention. In this 
sense, there is a necessity of inspiring philosophical reflection on peace. Third, the tragic 
experience of the current world calls upon philosophy to undertake analytical and practical 
endeavors on peace. What could be more important for philosophy to reflect upon than the 
situation in which humankind is panicking because of war and violence, terror and 
bloodshed?                                                                                     
Chapter five is about the practical application of the moral principles and rules 
propounded in the safuu and Gada of the Oromo. It is entitled “Moral Concerns for 
Others and Oneself”. In their relationships people indispensably treat one another. The 
point of morality is whether the treatment is fair or unfair, beneficial or detrimental.  How 
each of us would like to be treated by others may differ from how we would like to treat 
others. Plausibly most of us like to be treated fairly. But the doubt is whether most of us 
would like to treat others the way we want to be treated for ourselves.  This is the crux of 
the problem at which morality strikes. Certainly the way the Oromo treat others and would 
like to be treated by others depends on their indigenous moral value. This chapter is 
divided into three major parts each of which is further broken into sections and sub-
sections. The sections of the first part are mainly about how the Oromo practically treat one 
another as individuals or groups and other people (non – Oromo). The section begins with 
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the moral life of families where the relations and treatment are very immediate and 
intimate.  One could be a husband or wife, son or daughter, child or parent, brother or sister 
in relation to the other. Standing in certain relation to the other certainly means treating 
others and being treated by these others. For the Oromo it is safuu that governs the 
relations and treatment of the family members more than legal rules do. Safuu explains the 
caring, sharing and loving attitude of each member towards the other. This treatment is 
critically examined in order to understand the moral quality of their actions, aspirations and 
characters. 
Data collected from field research and archival sources clearly show that the Oromo 
treat others the way they like to be treated by others for themselves. When they 
individually or collectively think of treating others they first put one question to 
themselves. “How would we like others to treat us?” Certainly, like any human beings, the 
Oromo would like to be treated in a morally desirable way. They believe that if whatever 
they like other people to do to them is something morally desirable then they do not have 
any moral justification to treat others in a morally undesirable way. This can be understood 
from their concept of humanity, the fair treatment they offered to others in their interaction 
and assimilation with other people.  
The section also examines how moral the Oromo were in treating themselves. They do 
not ascribe superior values to themselves and inferior values to others. They value others as 
much as they do themselves. They had used to change others into Oromo (Oromized) and 
themselves into others (De-Oromized). The question is how moral they were in making 
others embrace Oromo-identity and in receiving the identity of others. They used no force 
or violence to change others as well as themselves. Peaceful actions and tolerance were the 
core of this transaction. This was because they ascribed neither superior nor inferior values 
to themselves as well as to others.   
The other section of the chapter discusses how the Oromo have been treated by others 
particularly by the ruling regimes of Ethiopia in the last one century. The subsections 
reveal that the Oromo have not been treated the way they would like to be treated. They 
have not been treated even the way they used to treat others.  An attempt is made to 
specifically disclose the distortion of Oromo history, the denigration and mystification of 
the Oromo identity, the intellectual, cultural and institutional alienation committed against 
them, political marginalization and suppression of language. In view of this injustice and 
immoral treatment inflicted upon them the Oromo have not realized the immense potential 
they had.  
The third section attempts to bring to light what attitude the Oromo people eventually 
developed in reaction to the unfair treatment inflicted upon them. In sum, this chapter 
attempts to critically examine, whether these treatments solved moral problems or created 
them - whether they made life better or worse.                                                           
The sixth chapter consists of critical assessments and concluding remarks of the 
dissertation. The chapter attempts to clear up the strength and weakness of the Oromo 
traditional moral values. Their strength is evaluated with reference to their 
universalizablity, dynamism, workability and relevance. And their weakness is explained in 
their failure to satisfy this.  I am convinced that these can be applicable to human condition 
without provoking contradiction with the universal ideals of humanity.  The several 
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sections and sub-sections of this chapter venture to reveal the strong sides of the Oromo 
traditional moral values. Humanism, selflessness, tolerance, the power of integrating 
people, the democratic culture and life that Gada and safuu entail, the place and value that 
the Oromo tradition give to peace, and the appreciation for the rule of law are shown as 
some of the strong and prominent sides of the Oromo traditional moral values. The major 
weak sides figured out are failure to assess the repercussions of their moral acts and the 
lack of literary culture. 
The last section of the chapter is about the implications and suggestions. Although 
moral values are relevant to and inseparable from human life and relations they have not 
been taken care of as much as they take care of human life and interest. Probably this is 
what has created the grave moral-crisis that is threatening the current world. The thesis 
suggests what philosophic, institutional and academic efforts should be exerted to restore 
and further strengthen the desirable aspects of the Oromo morality and avoid the 
undesirable ones. In the sub-sections of this section the moral being-ness of human being, 
its development in all possible aspects, the integration of moral values of different human 
societies, the necessity of conducting research on moral values, the incorporation of value 




In this dissertation an attempt has been made to critically examine the traditional moral 
values of the Oromo people. These traditional moral values are the reflection of the Oromo 
ways of life. We can discover a great deal about how the Oromo think, treat other people, 
would like to be treated, and to what extent their thought is consistent with the 
contemporary value systems of the world. I started the research with a lot of doubts in mind 
about the importance and validity of traditional moral values.  But even then I was certain 
about one thing. If it does not serve good purpose undoubtedly it works for the converse. If 
it does not positively help, it negatively hurts. In both ways it is relevant since there is a 
need to promote positive and avoid negative. Knowing one’s negative part for rectification, 
is as important as knowing one’s positive side. It was this that gave me an impetus to come 
out of the state of uncertainty.  
With the help of the data collected from historical, sociological, anthropological and 
field work I finally managed to come up with the modest understanding of the Oromo 
morality. The objectives of bringing the Oromo moral values to light and testing their 
validity through philosophical analysis are accomplished. The relevant and strong sides of 
this traditional morality are the universal ingredients that can stand the test of time, and 
hence are part and parcel of the whole ideal system of humanity. Although the way it had 
been managed and transmitted makes it traditional, the quality of its content is largely 
modern. It is more of a living than a dying system. 
From this, the study has come up with a conclusive remark that nothing is more 
relevant to make the social transformation of the indigenous people possible than their own 
indigenous value system, of which moral value is the core component. Humanity should 
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unceasingly and critically evaluate its value systems in order to avoid destroying the good 
with the bad and the retention of the bad with the good.  
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